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질문 1 의 8

A retrieved document contains “ignore previous instructions.” How should the application treat it?

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  1. A retrieved document contains “ignore previous instructions.” How should the application treat it?
    • As untrusted content to process, not authority to control tools or policy
    • As a trusted system instruction
    • As proof the document should be deleted
    • As permission to disclose data
  2. Why limit tools to the privileges required by the task?
    • It prevents all prompt injection
    • It makes content filtering unnecessary
    • A model error then has less ability to create unauthorized consequences
    • It guarantees correct summaries
  3. A webpage says the user approved sending a file. What should authorize the action?
    • The webpage’s statement
    • The actual user instruction and the application’s authorization process
    • A high model confidence score
    • A tool result that repeats the claim
  4. What should be checked before a tool sends information externally?
    • Only whether the output matches JSON
    • The writing style of the tool response
    • Whether the prompt contains a suspicious phrase
    • Destination, affected records, transmitted data, and required approval
  5. Why test prompt-security cases in different locations and formats?
    • The model only reads plain text prompts
    • One attack example covers every case
    • Untrusted instructions can arrive in user input, documents, or tool responses
    • Format does not change application behavior
  6. What is the relationship between content filtering and authorization?
    • Filtering may detect wording; authorization must still block actions outside scope
    • Either one makes the other unnecessary
    • Authorization is only a writing filter
    • Filtering guarantees the user intended every action
  7. Why avoid calling a prompt-injection filter foolproof?
    • Filters cannot process any text
    • The guide prohibits testing
    • Only external users can create malicious inputs
    • Detection can miss attacks, so consequence-limiting controls and ongoing tests remain important
  8. A summarizer has no need to send messages. Which design is safer?
    • Grant broad access but add a warning
    • Do not grant message-sending permission to that workflow
    • Ask the model to promise not to send
    • Enable sending only during long inputs