Ikibazo gihuza ibibazo · Hagati Urwego

Kwihutira gutera inshinge

Ongera usuzume amabwiriza yo kwizerana no gutera inshinge zitaziguye, hamwe nibikoresho birimo, amahugurwa yubuyobozi, guhagarika imirimo, hamwe ningaruka zo kwinjiza ibintu byinshi.

Inzira zijyanye no kuyoboraIbitero byihutirwa
Ikibazo 1 Bya 8

Which trust failure can a prompt-injection attempt exploit?

Reba buri kibazo8 ibibazo

Ibisubizo nibisobanuro bigaragara mugihe ufata ikibazo.

  1. Which trust failure can a prompt-injection attempt exploit?
    • Adversarial instructions in task material being followed as authoritative commands
    • A requirement that every model encrypt its entire context
    • A guarantee that all models have administrator privileges
    • A requirement that every model always obey every input
  2. Nigute INDIRECT yatewe inshinge itandukanye ninshinge itaziguye?
    • Ikora gusa kumashusho yerekana
    • Birasaba kwinjira kumubiri kuri seriveri
    • Amabwiriza mabi abaho mumasoko yo hanze icyitegererezo nyuma gisoma, ntabwo mubutumwa bwumukoresha wenyine
    • Bikorwa nuwitezimbere kubushake
  3. Which availability goal does the cited indirect-injection taxonomy include?
    • Only stealing an entire training corpus in every attack
    • Inhibiting useful responses or disrupting a search task
    • Only changing a GPU’s physical memory size
    • Only improving all authorized search results
  4. How can least-privilege tool permissions limit a successful injection’s consequences?
    • They prove every allowed operation is harmless in every context
    • They guarantee the model never proposes an injected action
    • They remove the need for any output or action validation
    • They restrict the operations and resources available to the workflow
  5. What behavior does the Instruction Hierarchy study aim to train?
    • Sorting all retrieved words alphabetically
    • Treating every webpage as more authoritative than the developer
    • Following privileged instructions over conflicting lower-priority content
    • Encrypting the model vocabulary with an image key
  6. Kuki inshinge zihuse ziba mbi cyane nkuko abakozi ba AI bunguka ibikoresho?
    • Umukozi wibeshya arashobora gufata ibikorwa byukuri nko kohereza imeri, kode ikoresha, cyangwa amakuru asohoka
    • Abakozi bakora buhoro buhoro hamwe nibikoresho
    • Ibikoresho bituma icyitegererezo cyibagirwa imyitozo yacyo
    • Ibikoresho byikubye kabiri icyitegererezo
  7. Why should a prompt-injection evaluation cover images when an application accepts multimodal input?
    • Images guarantee that all instructions are trustworthy
    • An image can contain only one numerical scalar
    • Plain-text testing automatically covers every image input
    • Adversarial instructions can be embedded in an image channel
  8. Why is merely quoting an attack instruction not enough to establish that an application was compromised?
    • Every quoted string necessarily changes system permissions
    • The text may be legitimate analysis material and may never be executed as an instruction
    • An attacker must modify all original model weights first
    • No authorized user can ever discuss a security attack