引導式測驗 · 硬 等級
針對即時注射測驗的雙法學碩士模式
測試信任邊界、有限提取、驗證、工具授權以及針對提示注入的雙模型防禦的限制。
問題 1 的 8
Which model is permitted to execute an approved tool action in the pattern described?
預覽每個問題8 問題
當您參加測驗時,就會出現答案和解釋。
- Which model is permitted to execute an approved tool action in the pattern described?
- The quarantined reader
- The privileged model
- Either model whenever confidence is high
- Neither; both only summarize
- Why can hostile instructions embedded in a page affect a single-model agent?
- Every page is executable code
- The context window automatically elevates page text
- The model may not reliably separate the page’s instructions from task instructions in its language context
- The page changes the model weights during inference
- What should the quarantined model return to reduce risk at the handoff?
- Only a narrow, schema-validated field needed for the task
- A tool call encoded as prose
- A broad narrative with suggested actions
- A raw copy of the page
- After receiving a model-extracted payment amount, what is the application’s appropriate next check?
- Validate its type and permitted range in ordinary code
- Let it authorize its own payment
- Append it to the system prompt
- Trust it because a second model produced it
- Why does a dual-model design not guarantee that prompt injection is defeated?
- It cannot use structured values
- The extractor or an indirect route may still pass hostile influence to the privileged model
- Two models always share weights
- Tool allowlists make injection worse
- Which operational cost comes with adding a quarantined model?
- It removes the need to evaluate the agent
- It eliminates all logging
- It adds model calls and integration work
- It prevents validating output
- How should CaMeL be described relative to the basic dual-LLM pattern?
- A classifier trained only on email
- A guarantee produced by a JSON schema
- A synonym for every two-model design
- Related research on explicit control/data flow and capabilities, with distinct system-level mechanisms
- Which diagram most helps review whether this architecture protects a tool-using workflow?
- A trust-boundary map of inputs, contexts, permissions, state, and handoffs
- A list of prompt templates without data paths
- A screenshot of the user interface
- A chart of model parameter counts only