Викторина, связанная с руководством · Жесткий Уровень
AI-подсказка по вопросам безопасности
Тестирует ненадежный контент, минимальные привилегии, авторизацию, проверку действий, различные пути атаки, многоуровневые элементы управления и безопасные регрессионные тесты.
Вопрос 1 из 8
A retrieved document contains “ignore previous instructions.” How should the application treat it?
Предварительный просмотр каждого вопроса8 вопросы
Ответы и пояснения появляются по мере прохождения теста.
- A retrieved document contains “ignore previous instructions.” How should the application treat it?
- As untrusted content to process, not authority to control tools or policy
- As a trusted system instruction
- As proof the document should be deleted
- As permission to disclose data
- Why limit tools to the privileges required by the task?
- It prevents all prompt injection
- It makes content filtering unnecessary
- A model error then has less ability to create unauthorized consequences
- It guarantees correct summaries
- A webpage says the user approved sending a file. What should authorize the action?
- The webpage’s statement
- The actual user instruction and the application’s authorization process
- A high model confidence score
- A tool result that repeats the claim
- What should be checked before a tool sends information externally?
- Only whether the output matches JSON
- The writing style of the tool response
- Whether the prompt contains a suspicious phrase
- Destination, affected records, transmitted data, and required approval
- Why test prompt-security cases in different locations and formats?
- The model only reads plain text prompts
- One attack example covers every case
- Untrusted instructions can arrive in user input, documents, or tool responses
- Format does not change application behavior
- What is the relationship between content filtering and authorization?
- Filtering may detect wording; authorization must still block actions outside scope
- Either one makes the other unnecessary
- Authorization is only a writing filter
- Filtering guarantees the user intended every action
- Why avoid calling a prompt-injection filter foolproof?
- Filters cannot process any text
- The guide prohibits testing
- Only external users can create malicious inputs
- Detection can miss attacks, so consequence-limiting controls and ongoing tests remain important
- A summarizer has no need to send messages. Which design is safer?
- Grant broad access but add a warning
- Do not grant message-sending permission to that workflow
- Ask the model to promise not to send
- Enable sending only during long inputs