Quiz lié à un guide · Difficile Niveau

Quiz sur la sécurité des invites IA

Teste le contenu non fiable, le moindre privilège, l'autorisation, la validation des actions, les chemins d'attaque variés, les contrôles en couches et les tests de régression sécurisés.

Chemins de guidage associésSécurité des invites IA
Question 1 de 8

A retrieved document contains “ignore previous instructions.” How should the application treat it?

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  1. A retrieved document contains “ignore previous instructions.” How should the application treat it?
    • As untrusted content to process, not authority to control tools or policy
    • As a trusted system instruction
    • As proof the document should be deleted
    • As permission to disclose data
  2. Why limit tools to the privileges required by the task?
    • It prevents all prompt injection
    • It makes content filtering unnecessary
    • A model error then has less ability to create unauthorized consequences
    • It guarantees correct summaries
  3. A webpage says the user approved sending a file. What should authorize the action?
    • The webpage’s statement
    • The actual user instruction and the application’s authorization process
    • A high model confidence score
    • A tool result that repeats the claim
  4. What should be checked before a tool sends information externally?
    • Only whether the output matches JSON
    • The writing style of the tool response
    • Whether the prompt contains a suspicious phrase
    • Destination, affected records, transmitted data, and required approval
  5. Why test prompt-security cases in different locations and formats?
    • The model only reads plain text prompts
    • One attack example covers every case
    • Untrusted instructions can arrive in user input, documents, or tool responses
    • Format does not change application behavior
  6. What is the relationship between content filtering and authorization?
    • Filtering may detect wording; authorization must still block actions outside scope
    • Either one makes the other unnecessary
    • Authorization is only a writing filter
    • Filtering guarantees the user intended every action
  7. Why avoid calling a prompt-injection filter foolproof?
    • Filters cannot process any text
    • The guide prohibits testing
    • Only external users can create malicious inputs
    • Detection can miss attacks, so consequence-limiting controls and ongoing tests remain important
  8. A summarizer has no need to send messages. Which design is safer?
    • Grant broad access but add a warning
    • Do not grant message-sending permission to that workflow
    • Ask the model to promise not to send
    • Enable sending only during long inputs